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Presentation: “Elbert D. Thomas: Forgotten Internationalist Missionary, Scholar,
New Deal Senator, Japanophile, and Visionary” by Iguchi Haruo
Comments by Hayashi Yoshikatsu
Hayashi’s comments and questions:
1. In relation to Iguchi’s remark on “American tutelage” to guide Japan towards
more peaceful behavior in the late 1930s, Hayashi asked why Thomas thought
this was possible.
Iguchi’ s reply: In the late 1930s, Thomas’ s view was “more of wishful
thinking.” His thinking was that war would be disastrous, so that Japan should
conform to international norms to avoid it. He hoped that such persuasion
combined with pressure would make Japan behave more peacefully. Given the
lack of evidence to prove it, the general impact of Thomas’s activities in the years
1935-36 must be analyzed by gathering more documents.
2. During the war Thomas urged the Japanese to follow the ideals laid down by
the Meiji constitution. It seems, however, that his reform principles and ideas
had changed from returning to the Meiji constitutional system to making Japan
conform to the US-led world order based on liberal democracy. If so, why did
his change of ideas take place in such a short period of time?
Iguchi’s reply: During the war Thomas did not articulate what sort of reform
should take place in Japan after the war, leaving the status of the Emperor and the
power structure open-ended. However, he was not the same person after the war.
He did advocate the dissolution of the zaibatsu as well as the need to change the
Meiji constitution.
3. Concerning Japan’s decision to surrender, Thomas referred to “the decision by
the Emperor and the willingness of the Japanese people to embrace surrender
based on their trust of Americans.” Hayashi asked Iguchi to clarify why
Thomas regarded Japanese trust of Americans as one of the major reasons for
surrender.
Iguchi’s reply: Thomas’s remark was made in 1948, so he was reading back
to the past in the context of the “reverse course” as well as what was happening in
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mainland China. In 1948, it seemed to him that many Japanese tended to trust the
Americans and it was a major remaining factor in Japan. Thomas did not mention
anything about the Soviet factor in Japan’s surrender but he did mention that the
Emperor paid attention to the atomic bombs as a factor.
4. Iguchi mentioned that Thomas’s perception of Japan and the Japanese reflected
humanitarianism and missionary internationalism that overlapped with
Wilsonian internationalism. Hayashi wanted the presenter to elaborate more on
the relationship between the two aspects of internationalism.
Iguchi’s reply: Thomas was a member of the Academic Society specializing
in international law. He believed that respect for international law and the rule of
law were important in creating international order and stability. He was also
interested in promoting American ideas and ideals abroad. In this sense, his
internationalism overlapped with the elements of Wilsonian internationalism.
Andrew Rotter’s questions:
1. Rotter inquired if Thomas was reading the anthropological literature like Ruth
Benedict’ s about the Japanese that was used during the wartime by
policymakers to understand the enemy. Their work was historically to suggest
that the Japanese had a singular, particular culture, often fomenting a certain
approach to Japan.
Iguchi’s reply: Thomas’s view of the Japanese was that they had a different
culture and their own view of the world. However, he also believed that the
Japanese had commonalities with others. In 1943 he spearheaded a movement in
the US to save Jews in Nazi Germany, which put President Franklin D. Roosevelt
in an awkward position. He argued that Washington should intervene in the
German concentration camps. He was also concerned with the predicament of the
Japanese-American citizens during the war. These activities had to do with his
humanitarianism.
2. Did Thomas have any influence on James Byrnes, Joseph Grew and Harry
Truman? Did he matter in making policy toward Japan? In this connection,
what is the role of a biography? Are individuals involved in policymaking
overmatched by institutions or cultures? Do individual activities reflect
anything about large intellectual or social trends? Does Thomas stand for
anything?
Iguchi’s reply: As for Thomas’s relationships with the key policymakers, he
needs to further look into archival materials. But a biography is relevant for a
better understanding of US foreign relations. His paper focused more on the
Thomas’s discourse and thinking rather than the impact of his activities upon the
decision-making process. However, his presentation about Thomas was part of
his larger project to paint continuity and discontinuity in US-Japan relations
through such figures as Kenneth Colegrove, Edwin O. Reishchauer, and Mike
Masaoka.
Questions and comments were also raised from the floor but unfortunately
there is no space for introducing them here. Some of them were similar to
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Hayashi’s or Rotter’s, otherwise, answers can be found by reading Higuchi’s
paper. However, a couple of questions from the floor are worth mentioning.
1. The “Japan hands” tried to promote the mythical idea as if the “real Japanese”
exist. They also tried to find in the activities of the Japanese-Americans
Citizens League, a model minority who were forced into the concentration
camps but nevertheless loyal to the US. It seems that Thomas was also a
member of one of those political coalitions who tried to promote an idea of the
“real Japanese.” The assumption here is that if they were given their chance,
Japan would become non-threatening to the US and the world. This kind of
image has a strong class component, given the background of those who tried
to promote it.
Iguchi’s reply: Thomas had his own idea of “model Japanese.” He believed
that the middle class Japanese would be more open to the outside world. He
thought during wartime that most Japanese and Germans are good people and that
a majority of the Japanese would not follow the small minority of the military in
control of wartime Japan. Get rid of the Japanese perpetrators and put the middle
class people back in charge of politics, and then a strong middle class Japan
would bring stability and order to the world.
2. Iguchi pointed out that Thomas in the 1930s regarded Japan as a stabilizing
force in Asia. What did he think about Japanese imperialism in Korea and
Taiwan? Was he going to leave it the way it was or did he have any proposal
to change things?
Iguchi’s reply: Thomas was not necessarily critical of Japanese imperialism
in Korea and Taiwan in the 1930s. However, when the Roosevelt administration
was moving toward decolonization of Asia, Thomas went along with the
president’s policy including Korea and Taiwan. On the other hand, Thomas was
critical of Japanese imperialism in China beginning with the Manchurian Incident
in 1931.
As Rotter commented, and others would agree, Iguchi’s paper showed that
Congress tended to be neglected in the study of US foreign relations and that it
reminded us of the importance of the role of Congress and Senators like Elbert
Thomas.
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